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Abstract 
This paper begins by ranking the absolute value of changes in the 10-year break-
even inflation (BEI) calculated using 10-year Treasury notes and 10-year TIPS.  Next, a 
news search is conducted to determine what inflation related information was released on 
days when the change in the BEI was greatest.  The goal of the analysis is not only to see 
what information is associated with large changes in the BEI, but also to gain insight into 
the extent to which market participants accept the three competing theories of price 
determination: the classic monetary theory, the fiscal theory, and a “Keynesian” model that 
combines central bank setting of interest rates with the Philips curve.  I find that there was 
no mention of the money supply, the demand for money, or the rate of monetary growth on 
any of the days on which there was a large change in the BEI.  Further, I find that there was 
only one mention of the impact of government debt on a day where the BEI changed 
substantially.  In comparison, there were 53 news items on large change days that either 
explicitly discussed Federal Reserve policy regarding interest rates or focused on the 
interaction between Fed policy, economic activity and expected inflation.  This suggests 
that market participants accept the “Keynesian” model of price determination. 
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Introduction 
 There have been numerous studies that have examined the impact of policy 
announcements on expected inflation.  Some recent contributions include, Bauer (2014, 
2015), Beechey and Wright (2009), and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).  In this 
study, I turn the analysis on its head and use the approach developed by Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1989) and Cornell (2014).  Instead of starting with announcement dates, I use 
changes in market prices as a measure of the flow of inflation related information.  I then go 
back and examine the news from the days on which the estimated information flow was the 
greatest to see what inflation related disclosures occurred on those days. 
 More specifically, I use change in the breakeven expected inflation (BEI) calculated 
as the difference between the yield to maturity on the 10-year constant maturity Treasury 
note and the constant maturity 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS) as a 
measure of the flow of inflation related information.  I choose the 10-year Treasuries 
because, as discussed further below, there are anomalies associated with the quoted yields 
on the shorter maturity TIPS.  It is important to stress that for my purposes it is not critical 
that the BEI is an unbiased measure of expected inflation.  This is an issue because research 
by Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2014) points to an apparent anomaly in the pricing 
of the fixed rate securities relative to TIPS.  The authors conclude that Treasury bonds are 
consistently overpriced relative to TIPS.  If that is true, even the 10-year BEI will be a 
biased measure of expected inflation.  However, these issues are not problems for the 
current study.  What I require is a variable that captures the flow of information into the 
market, some of which may be private or involve unobservable sentiment, regarding long-
term inflation.  That is best captured by observing the price changes for the most actively 
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traded securities – hence the choice of the 10-year bonds.  Even if the level of the BEI is a 
biased measure of expected inflation, its change should still reflect the flow of inflation- 
related information with larger absolute changes reflecting greater information flow.  It is 
also for this reason that I choose the Treasury bond market over the inflation swap market.  
However, for the most part the days on which the changes in the 10-year BEI were the 
largest were basically the same as those days on which the price movements in the swap 
market were the greatest.  Therefore, the results I report are not sensitive to the variable 
used to measure the flow of information.  It is akin to using different stock indexes to 
measure changes in the level of equity prices.  The choice of index has little impact on the 
selection of the days with the largest movements. 
 As a warning at the outset, the aforementioned research by Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1989) and Cornell (2014), which looked at changes in the stock market indexes, 
pointed to two issues that are relevant here.  First, the authors found that even the largest 
changes in the indexes frequently occurred on days on which there were no disclosures of 
meaningful, value relevant information.  It is possible that the same may be true of the BEI.  
If so, this complicates the effort to match news with large price changes.  Second, the 
matching process is further complicated by the fact that the financial press feels compelled 
to offer an explanation for price movements.1  In the case of equities, for instance, big 
moves not associated with value relevant information were often attributed to “profit 
taking” or “investor fears” – vague statements with no valuation relevant content.  As a 
result, news reports have to be analyzed carefully to attempt to distinguish release of value 
relevant information from ex-post rationalizations of unexplained price movements. 
                                                 
1  This is less true of the fixed income markets than the equity markets because equity market price 
movements are generally large and attract more attention from the press. 
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 In addition to providing empirical data on what information is associated with large 
changes in expected inflation, a related objective of the paper is to provide some insight 
into the market participants’ interpretation of how the price level is determined.  Ironically, 
the question of what determines the price level has become more complicated and 
controversial in recent years.  As Cochrane (2011a) describes there are now at least three 
competing approaches to price level determination. 
 The first is the classic monetary theory.  As long as there is a reasonably stable 
demand for money, the Fed can control the price level by exploiting the famous relation 
MV = PY.  The problem as Cochrane (2005, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) has repeatedly stressed 
is that in the modern economy agents no longer have to hold an inventory of money to 
make transactions.  Thus, there is no reason to believe that the velocity will be stable.  In 
light of this fact, and to further complicate matters, the Fed no longer attempts to target the 
money supply.  Nonetheless, if the monetarist theory is accepted by market participants, 
large changes in expected inflation should be accompanied by news regarding the supply of 
or demand for money. 
 An alternative to the monetarist explanation is the fiscal theory of inflation, 
developed by Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994) and Woodford 
(2004), among others.  The fiscal theory is based on the observation that the real value of 
government debt, including money, should equal the expected present value of future 
government surpluses as given in a generic form by equation (1). 
 ே௢௠௜௡௔௟	஽௘௕௧೟௉௥௜௖௘	௅௘௩௘௟೟ 	ൌ ܧ௧ ∑
ோ௘௔௟	௣௥௜௠௔௥௬	௦௨௥௣௟௨௦೟శೕ
஽௜௦௖௢௨௡௧	௥௔௧௘೟శೕ
ஶ௝ୀ଴   
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 The implication of equation (1) is that inflation breaks out when people lose faith in 
the ability of the government to generate future surpluses to pay down the debt.  The 
resulting flight from government debt into goods, services and real assets produces 
inflation.  If this story is correct, then one would expect that large changes in the BEI would 
be associated with information regarding to ability of the government to repay its 
outstanding debts by running future surpluses.  That suggests looking for stories related to 
fiscal policy and government debt. 
 Finally, the third theory of inflation has little to do with money or government debt.  
According to this interpretation, which I call the “Keynesian” model, the Fed sets interest 
rates, interest rates affect demand, and demand affects inflation through the Phillips Curve.  
As Cochrane (2011c) explains, this explanation is hard to reconcile with fundamental 
microeconomic theory.  Nonetheless, if the market participants accept the explanation, then 
large changes in the BEI should be associated to news regarding and Fed interest rate policy 
and “aggregate demand.” 
 While the empirical analysis presented here in no sense constitutes a “test” of the 
competing theories of inflation, the hope is that the results will provide some suggestive 
insights.  Cataloging the information associated with large changes in BEI makes it possible 
to compare the implications of the competing theories. 
Data and Empirical Results 
 As noted at the outset, changes in the 10-year BEI are used as an estimate of the 
importance of the inflation related information impacting the market.  I first present results 
based on this data and then briefly discuss alternative data sets. 
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 The sample for the study is from January 1, 2003 through November 10, 2015.  
Using data from the Federal Reserve’s H.15 release, the 10-year BEI is calculated daily as 
the difference between the yield on the constant maturity 10-year note and the constant 
maturity 10-year TIPS.  Figure 1 plots both the BEI (in percentage points on the right axis) 
and the 40-day rolling standard deviation of daily changes in the BEI (in basis points on the 
left axis).  Looking first at the BEI, it bounded between 1.50% and 2.75% for most of the 
sample period.  The exception is a period beginning at the start of October 2008, following 
the bankruptcy of Lehman at the height of the financial crisis, when it plunges to near zero 
and remains there until January 2010 when it rises sharply returning to the original range by 
the end of April.  While this period is the most dramatic, the BEI is far from constant.  
Though it remains within the aforementioned range, it rises and falls repeatedly. 
 The rolling standard deviation of the daily changes is a mirror image of the BEI.  It 
ranges between 2 and 5 basis points throughout most of the period but jumps to over 11 
basis points during the interval following the bankruptcy of Lehman.  This suggests that the 
rate of information flow was higher during the post-Lehman interval. 
 Choosing what is meant by a “large” change in the BEI is somewhat arbitrary in 
light of the fact that the standard deviation is not constant.  Here I use a cut-off of 10 basis 
points in absolute value.  That cut-off produces 67 large changes out of 3,219 days in the 
full sampler period, or about 2% of the total sample.  The first two columns of Table 1 list 
the date and the basis point change for all 67 large changes.  Of those 67 days, 31 are in the 
interval between October 1, 2008 and April 30, 2009 – the period during which the BEI 
spikes downward and then recovers. 
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 The next task was to match the large changes with news regarding inflation.  The 
matching was designed to incorporate any news related to inflation.  The search for news 
stories included the day of and the day after the large change to make sure that any 
information that arrived between the two price observations is included.  Inflation related 
news was interpreted broadly in order to avoid excluding relevant disclosures.  As 
suggested by the competing theories of price determination, items in the search included, 
among other things, announcements of price indexes, statements regarding Fed policy and 
Fed decision making, articles on the impact of “aggregate demand” on inflation, any 
mention of money supply or demand, and articles relating inflation to government deficits 
or government debt issuance.2 
 Once they were collected, the news releases were placed into six buckets.  The 
buckets can overlap in that one disclosure could be placed in more than one bucket.  The 
buckets were selected, in part, to correspond to the types of information the three theories 
of price level determination suggest would be likely to have an impact on expected 
inflation.  The six buckets are as follows: 
 1.  News regarding Federal Reserve Policy. 
 2.  News regarding economic activity and aggregate “demand.” 
 3.  The release of data related to the CPI. 
 4.  The release of information related to the WPI. 
 5.  Information about the supply of or the demand for money. 
 6.  Information regarding fiscal policy and the level of government debt. 
                                                 
2  More complete data on the news releases is available from the author. 
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 The buckets are shown as columns in Table 1.  If there was a news item that fits in a 
given bucket it is recorded in the relevant column for that date.  Otherwise, the cell is left 
blank.  Admittedly, judgement is required to sort through the news stories and put the 
information disclosed into buckets.  This is particularly so because information about 
prices, aggregate demand and Fed policy was often intermingled as discussed further 
below.  It turns out, however, that the results are so dramatic that the basic conclusions do 
not depend on the manner in which the information is sorted into buckets at the margin.   
 First, and perhaps most surprisingly, Table 1 shows that there was no mention of the 
money supply, the demand for money, or the rate of monetary growth on any of the large 
change dates.  Open market operations were discussed on occasion, but only in the context 
of Fed policy regarding interest rates rather than the money supply per se.   
 Second, there was only one mention of the impact of government debt on large 
change days— an article describing how the large new issues of government debt were 
likely to lead to an increase in interest rates in order to absorb the supply.  However, the 
story did not relate the issuance of the new debt to inflation, nor was there any discussion of 
what the implications of the debt issuance were for long run fiscal stability.  Therefore, I 
see no way to tie the one mention of government debt to the fiscal theory of inflation in any 
meaningful fashion. 
 On the other hand, the news releases are highly consistent with the Keynesian 
model.  Whereas there was one news item that could be tied to the monetary and fiscal 
theories of inflation, there were 53 that fit directly into the Keynesian framework.  
Excluding the stories that simply reported data the release of price indexes is, virtually 
every news report related to inflation on days when there were large changes in the BEI 
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either explicitly discussed Federal Reserve policy regarding interest rates or focused on the 
interaction between Fed policy, economic activity and expected inflation.   
In fact, the news stories regarding Fed policy, economic activity were so intertwined 
in the fashion predicted by the Keynesian model that one rarely occurs without the other.  
For example, on March 18, 2008, Dow Jones Business News reported that,  
The Federal Reserve cut a key interest rate by three-quarters of one 
percentage point on Tuesday. The Fed action takes the federal funds rate 
target down to 2.25%, the lowest since December 2004. The Fed said the 
size of the rate cut was enough to promote growth. Cutting rates 
aggressively to boost the economy is also expected to lift inflation down the 
line.3   
Similarly, on September 16, 2008 the Dow Jones News Service reported that,  
The Federal Open Market Committee voted unanimously to keep the target 
fed funds rate unchanged at 2% for a third-straight meeting. In its statement, 
the FOMC continued to warn about inflation risks, but also signaled that 
economic concerns have intensified in the wake of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc.4 
 As one final example, on May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones News Service reported that,  
The two sides of the Fed's internal debate could be seen in comments by 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Eric Rosengren and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Thomas Hoenig.  Speaking 
Wednesday night in New York, Rosengren said a lack of price pressures and 
significant excess capacity means accommodative policy remains 
appropriate.  He went further, saying even with rapid growth in the 
economy, spurred by accommodative monetary policy and stimulative fiscal 
policy, it is likely to take years before we approach the growth and inflation 
rates that would really reflect' tight levels of unemployment.5 
3 “MARKET SNAPSHOT: U.S. Stocks Trim Rally in Aftermath of Fed Rate Cut,” Dow Jones Business 
News, March 18, 2008. 
4 “AT A GLANCE: Fed Keeps Rates Unchanged Amid Shaken Wall St,” Dow Jones News Service, 
September 16, 2008. 
5 “FED WATCH: Greek Debacle Doesn’t Divert Exit-Strategy Debate,” Dow Jones News Service, May 6, 
2010. 
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The list goes on and on.  The reporters, and the government officials and Wall Street 
experts they quote in the news releases I reviewed, treat the Keynesian model not as a 
hypothesis but as a largely proven theory.  This raises interesting questions because of the 
key role of expectations and beliefs in dynamic models of the economy.  Of course, it is 
possible that the financial press accepts the Keynesian model and uses it as a framework to 
report the news (like reports of profit taking referred to earlier), but sophisticated market 
participants think differently.  That possibility, however, is beyond the scope of the current 
research.  The results reported in Table 1 clearly show that the news that accompanied large 
changes in expected inflation was of a type consistent with the Keynesian model. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that on 26 of the 67 days there was no news that fit 
into any of the six buckets.  This is yet another example of the perplexing difficulty of 
explaining movements in asset prices even on the basis of ex-post observation of news.  As 
Ross (1995) observes,  
It is one thing not to be able to predict what asset returns will be since they 
will depend on news, and news, by definition, is information that has yet to 
be revealed. It is another, though, to observe the movement of prices and not 
know why they moved after the fact.  I am particularly troubled that 
contemporaneous news seems to explain so little of the contemporaneous 
motion of prices.6 
The current study underscores his observation. 
The impact of using alternative data 
The results reported here were limited to data on the 10-year BEI.  However, as 
noted earlier, the choice of day set is not critical in identifying the days on which large 
6 Ross, Stephen A, 1995, Neoclassical Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 64.
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changes occurred.  Though the ranking of days is affected somewhat, the overall sample of 
large changes days is highly similar when either 5-year TIPS data or inflation swap data are 
used to define large changes.   
 That said, there were anomalies in the 5-year data that render it less reliable.  For 
example, the 5-year BEI turned negative in November 2008 and fell all the way to minus 
2.24% by November 28.  Then it jumped back to minus 0.32% on the next trading day 
primarily because the yield on the 5-year TIPS dropped from 4.17% to 2.03%.  In 
comparison, the yield on the 10-year TIPS dropped only 22 basis points from 2.60% to 
2.38%.  One explanation for this anomalous behavior is that the 5-year TIPS were not very 
liquid.  For that reason, their yields were subject to sharp changes during the crisis – 
particularly during periods when there appeared to be an increase in demand for highly 
liquid securities.  This translated into anomalous BEI behavior because the fixed rate 
securities, which were much more liquid, were not subject to the same anomalies.  
Regardless of the explanation, I concluded that it was better to rely on the 10-year data, 
which did not evidence any such anomalies and were more liquid than the 5-year securities.   
Summary and Conclusions 
 To summarize, the empirical analysis produced two interesting results.  First, and 
most importantly, the current findings suggest that market participants accept what I have 
called the Keynesian model of price determination.  On days when there were large changes 
in the BEI, there was not one explicit mention of the supply of or demand for money.  
Similarly, there was only mention of the role of government debt and the story in which the 
debt was mentioned was not related to the fiscal theory of inflation.  In comparison, there 
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were 53 stories that focused on the interaction between Federal Reserve policies regarding 
interest rates and the impact of those policies on economic activity and inflation.   
 Second, on 26 of the 67 days in which there were large changes in the BEI there was 
no public release of information related to inflation.  This finding is consistent with studies 
of the equity market by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) and Cornell (2014) who find 
that a substantial fraction of the largest movements in equity prices could not be tied to the 
release of value relevant news.  It is further evidence of our inability to explain asset price 
movements, after the fact, on the basis of the public release of information.  That inability 
which remains one of the most vexing issues in financial economics. 
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Figure 1: 10-year BEI and 40 day rolling standard deviation of BEI changes
40‐day rolling standard deviation 10‐yr BEI
Table 1: News Stories Associated with Large Changes in BEI
Date BP Change in 10-Yr 
Breakeven Inflation
Fed Policy News Economic  Actviity 
and "Demand"
CPI data Money Supply 
and/or Demand
WPI data Fiscal Policy - 
Government Debt
2003-03-14 -18.00 1
2003-07-09 10.00
2004-06-15 -10.00 1 1
2008-03-17 -14.00
2008-03-18 11.00 1
2008-05-02 10.00 1 1
2008-09-02 -10.00
2008-09-15 -18.00 1 1
2008-09-16 -14.00 1 1
2008-09-19 33.00 1
2008-09-23 -12.00
2008-09-24 -11.00 1
2008-09-29 -17.00 1
2008-10-06 -18.00 1
2008-10-08 -15.00 1
2008-10-10 -13.00
2008-10-14 11.00
2008-10-17 14.00 1 1 1
2008-10-23 -10.00
2008-10-24 -22.00
2008-11-18 -22.00 1
2008-11-19 -21.00 1 1 1
2008-11-20 -36.00 1
2008-11-24 19.00 1
2008-12-03 11.00
2008-12-05 -13.00 1 1
2008-12-08 -14.00 1
2008-12-12 -12.00 1 1
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Table 1: News Stories Associated with Large Changes in BEI
Date BP Change in 10-Yr 
Breakeven Inflation
Fed Policy News Economic  Actviity 
and "Demand"
CPI data Money Supply 
and/or Demand
WPI data Fiscal Policy - 
Government Debt
2008-12-17 18.00 1
2008-12-18 -11.00
2009-01-06 27.00 1 1 1
2009-01-14 -14.00 1
2009-01-16 10.00 1
2009-01-29 14.00 1 1
2009-01-30 10.00
2009-02-06 12.00
2009-02-09 18.00 1 1
2009-02-10 -16.00 1 1
2009-02-11 -13.00
2009-02-17 -10.00
2009-02-24 -10.00 1 1
2009-03-18 11.00 1
2009-04-07 -11.00
2009-04-23 11.00
2009-05-07 11.00
2009-05-27 10.00
2009-06-01 11.00
2009-06-18 15.00
2009-07-06 -15.00
2009-07-07 11.00
2009-07-14 10.00
2009-07-15 12.00 1 1
2009-09-04 11.00 1
2010-05-06 -12.00
2010-05-20 -15.00
2010-05-27 10.00 1 1 1
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Table 1: News Stories Associated with Large Changes in BEI
Date BP Change in 10-Yr 
Breakeven Inflation
Fed Policy News Economic  Actviity 
and "Demand"
CPI data Money Supply 
and/or Demand
WPI data Fiscal Policy - 
Government Debt
2010-06-04 -11.00
2011-01-20 -13.00
2011-05-19 -10.00 1 1
2011-08-10 10.00 1 1
2011-08-18 -17.00 1
2011-09-22 -15.00 1 1
2011-10-27 10.00
2011-12-20 10.00 1 1
2012-09-14 17.00 1
2013-04-18 -10.00 1
2014-01-23 -12.00
Totals 67 27 26 6 0 1 1
Page 3 of 3
